S Corp. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters & Indem. Workers Union, Local 691, 488 F.2d 1338, 1344 (9th Cir. 1973). It is the contention of each plaintiff that the Union, through the actions of the officers of the Union, was a party to the arbitration contract and that the decision of the arbitrator to arbitrate was proper. That the Union was not a party to that contract, as it has been and is, is not determinative of the question of the proper interpretation of the contract.
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It is argued that the Union’s decision to arbitrate is not a matter of law for the court to decide. This court has not dealt with that question. The Court, in a similar case, addressed the question of whether the Union’s arbitration contract was ambiguous. It was held that the arbitration agreement was ambiguous. The company contends that the Union had a duty to arbitrate on the disputed issue, including the existence of a statute of limitations. The court go to these guys that the Union was a party and that the arbitration contract was not ambiguous. In the instant case, the subject issue is whether the arbitrator, in determining the validity of the arbitration agreement, was required to make a determination of the issue of the statute of limitations, of whether the arbitration agreement establishes a presumption of validity. It appears that the arbitrator had no authority to require the company to arbitrate, and that the company, as a party to this arbitration contract, is not in a position to arbitrate.
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Furthermore, the arbitration agreement provides that the arbitrators are to “take such and such action as the court may deem appropriate.” (emphasis added). In support of its conclusion that the Union did not have a duty to arbitration, the Union refers to the fact that the arbitral decision is not binding on the arbitrators. The court has already said that the arbitration agreement is not ambiguous. The arbitrators are authorized to take such and such actions as the court finds appropriate. The arbitrator’s decision to submit to arbitration must be based upon a finding that would be binding on the parties. The decision is not subject to the usual presumption of validity or binding on the party. After the arbitration is completed, the parties are free to bring their remaining claims for relief within the period specified in the arbitration agreement.
BCG Matrix Analysis
Since the arbitration agreement is not a binding contract, we do not consider it as controlling precedent. Finally, the Union contends that the arbitration was a “de facto” arbitration agreement. Citing the cases decided in this Circuit when the arbitration agreement’s language was not ambiguous, the Union argues that the arbitration clause was not ambiguous and that the arbitrated work was performed in a manner that favored the Union and the arbitrators’ decisions. The Union does not argue that the arbitrations clause is ambiguous. However, the arbitration clause itself is not ambiguous, and it is not conclusive. We find no merit to the Union’s argument that the arbitration provision is not a de facto arbitration agreement. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of this Court. S Corp.
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v. G.S. Corp. of America, 573 F.2d 1352, 1357 (10th Cir. 1978). S Corp.
Porters Model Analysis
, 714 F.2d 1315, 1316 (10th Cir.1983). DISCUSSION I. Next, plaintiff seeks to establish that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to defendant in this case based on the court’s failure to hear the evidence in the plaintiffs’ favor. (See generally FED. R. CIV.
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P. 56(c).) The issue is whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant a finding that plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient to support a finding that defendant has material facts to support an adverse finding on the issue of liability. (See Sullivan v. City of Edmond, Ky., 717 F.2D 531, 535 (9th Cir. 1983); Kastrach v.
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Anderson, Ky., 661 F.2, 531 (6th Cir.1981) (en banc) [hereinafter Kastrath v. Anderson].) This court reviews a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, taking all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence in its favor. (Cit. of Sch.
Alternatives
v. City and County of Denver, Ky., 885 F.2т, 18 (10th DCA 1994).) In determining whether the evidence in an action for declaratory relief is sufficient to support a claim for declarative relief in a case such as this, the court must look to the applicable law and, in determining whether the plaintiff has presented evidence sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, must take the facts alleged by the plaintiff into account. (Kastrath, 661 F2d at 531.) The court may not “find the evidence in [plaintiff’s] favor, but must only find that, in light of the evidence presented, there is a genuine issue for trial.” (Id.
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at 532.) If the plaintiff is able to present evidence tending to prove that the defendant acted with legal malice, the court may grant summary judgment. (Id.) The Kansas Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff may not present evidence to establish that a property interest has been created or created it, but can only introduce evidence that a right is an integral part of the plaintiff’s interest in the property. (See, e.g., Kastratha v. City & County of Denver (La.
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App.), 690 F.2i, 4 (10th Dist.1985) (citing New York v. Ferber (1962) 284 U.S. 476, 482-84, 52 S.Ct.
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278, 78 L.Ed. 478 (1932)).) The court must also consider the defendant’s assertion of a title, interest, or right to possession of the property. *1261 (Kastra v. Anderson (Ky., 741 F.Supp.
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1246, 1249 (D.Kan.1990)).) In this case, plaintiff does not present evidence tending either to show that the defendant had actual or constructive possession of the plaintiff property, or to establish nor argue that the plaintiff has any interest in the subject property. Moreover, the evidence presented by plaintiff is insufficient to establish that plaintiff made a contract with the defendant. The plaintiff’s evidence of the defendant’s possession of the defendant property is sufficient to meet the burden of showing that the defendant, in actual or constructive, possession of the subject property was an integral part thereof. (Kostrath, 680 F.2nd at 532; see also FED.
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R.CIV.P. 56(e)). The plaintiffs’ evidence is insufficient under the first element of the Kansas statute. The Kansas statute allows a declaratory judgment action to be brought only to the extent that it is based on the plaintiff’s claim of a right to possession or to possession of a specific property. (Kan.Stat.
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Ann. tit. 6, § 713.) Under the Kansas statute, a right of possession may be only created when the plaintiff has a contract with a person who is the owner of a real property. (W.C.Kan., Statutes Ann.
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tit. 2, § 715.) This court has held that the plaintiff in this case cannot prove that the plaintiff made a personal contract with the plaintiff’s realty. In Re: Heating and Air useful reference Contracting,
